

Security Information

4 March 1952

CONFERENCE

between

25X1A

and

Members of the WORKING GROUPS of the CAREER SERVICE COMMITTEE

20 February 1952, 11:00 - 12:45

Present:

25X1A

Consultant

Consultant

Career Service Committee

Personnel

PC

Training

o/Training

o/SI

o/Training

o/Personnel

RR

George Meloon, o/Personnel

o/SO

o/Training

o/Training

CI

o/Personnel

o/CD

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a firm of management consultants. He has had wide experience in planning development programs both in industry and in government during the war. Mr. [REDACTED] has been consultant to CIA since June 1951, when he was consulted by Mr. [REDACTED] with respect to the 7 August "Program for the Establishment of a Career Corps in the CIA," particularly that part which had to do with the evaluation of personnel. He is completely cleared by Security and we can, therefore, discuss whatever matters are necessary in order to arrive at the best conclusions and recommendations. Mr. [REDACTED] has not yet had adequate opportunity to learn the details of CIA organization. He therefore cannot give pointed answers to some of our problems because he does not yet know the framework, but he will answer in general whatever questions come up based on experience and practice in other situations. He knows that all of you who are present have been concerned for some time with preparing the plan for the Career Service Program. This conference can best be a "question and answer" session. Mr. [REDACTED] will be back at a later time when he has had a chance to assimilate and reflect on all the problems he will learn of today. It is up to us to provide him with the tools by means of which he can give us the best advice.

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- 25X1A 2. [REDACTED] We are dealing with the problem of how to evaluate people and mold behavior. If we really knew how to do this, it would be a better world. Every time I have consulted on executive development, I have learned a great deal and I am sure this is going to be no exception. If any of my previous experiences will help you, I will be happy. First, let me ask this: "Can you tell me what you are really trying to accomplish by this Program?"
- 25X1A 3. [REDACTED] What we are trying to accomplish is to formalize to a desirable extent the feeling of service and of essentiality of an individual to the mission of CIA; to let the individual realize that it is recognized, and to create a state of accord that will enable him to put up with the hardships, restrictions, anonymity, etc. that are inherent in our job.
- 25X1A 4. [REDACTED] The primary aim of most programs of this kind is the development of people to perform certain tasks. I assume, therefore, that morale is the by-product and accomplishment of the mission of the Agency is the primary product.
- 25X1A 5. [REDACTED] That is, of course, entirely correct. I would like to ask others who are present to discuss this in further detail.
- 25X1A 6. [REDACTED] Our problems are not like anyone else's. The only solution is the one we can work out for ourselves.
- 25X1A 7. [REDACTED]: You are right. The same applies equally to any other organization.
- 25X1A 8. [REDACTED] Another thing with which we are concerned is that intelligence of the sort that we are engaged in is a brand new thing in this country and there never has been any precedent to tie it to. Therefore, many have felt that we have to provide something in this Agency to establish a profession that will be comparable to other professions and sought out by people coming along during the next twenty years or so. It has to be firmly established.
- 25X1A 9. [REDACTED] The basis for the task is to sit down and think what it takes to do the necessary jobs. The foundation of any good organization starts off in this way. What do people in this organization have to do? What kind of people does it take to perform these jobs? What do they have to know and where and how can they get this know-how? Since you in CIA are carving out something new it becomes even more important to do this. In many other organizations this essential step can be skipped without too much harm, -- it is already worked out and everybody knows what it is. The most important thing this Agency has to do is to sit down and take the key jobs at various levels in the

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Agency, and say: What does this man have to do? What kind of a person does he have to be? What does he have to know? Where can he get that knowledge? Has that been the way you have approached this job?

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10. [REDACTED] Maybe we have done half the job and not the whole job. We know reasonably well what has to be done, - what the job requirements are, - but we do not yet have organized answers to the other three questions.

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11. [REDACTED] I suggest you create a form in which you say what this man has to do, what he has to be, what he has to know, where and how he gets the know-how, and then, carrying on from there, how you judge whether he has done it or not? Take a specific job and explore how and in as much detail as necessary what a man has to do. Specifically, what qualities does this job require? What does a man have to know and where can he get it -- in or out of the Agency?

12. Mr. Melcon: I do not think our study has reached that stage yet. It will be the responsibility of Personnel to implement the plans when the time comes. It will mean that we must:

- a. Take the job sheets and make sure that they are complete.
- b. Write the qualifications standards.
- c. Tie the rating system in with the job sheet.
- d. Relate the schedule of tests used in employment matters with validated qualifications requirements.

In all respects, we haven't gone that far.

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13. [REDACTED] The question of what a man has to do is reasonably well under control, but the problem of what he has to be or what experience he needs to have has not really been tackled.

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14. [REDACTED] The kind of job description that you require for the purpose of "putting a price" on the job, that is job classification in the ordinary sense, would not generally be enough. An analysis of the job and the man has to be made simultaneously.

15. Mr. Melcon: Job sheets of covert Offices in particular are too general and do not give enough detail. They had to be approved by the Civil Service Commission; consequently, details have had to be eliminated for security reasons. We probably have lumped too many jobs in the Intelligence Officer category and should make a breakdown in greater detail.

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16. [REDACTED]: You might say that the Career Service Program has been outlined in general terms by the Working Groups, based on the members' knowledge of Agency needs. This blueprint has probably been carried as far as possible, pending more detailed study of job needs.

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17. [REDACTED]: In the case of CIA the question of qualification for a job is more important than ordinarily. You are really carving out something new. If this program did nothing more than result in focusing the best minds of the Agency on what you have to do in order to do the job well, it would be worth all the time you have to spend on it. A tremendously important benefit can be obtained from doing just that one thing. I do not see how you can do much more than block the Program out in very broad outline until you know the answer to the four questions we have mentioned. How can you use job rotation as a development method until you know the requirements people have to have - required experience - in the various jobs? The thing to be avoided is to get into development for development's sake. It has been well established that people's behavior is influenced only in terms of real problems. Whatever is done on the Career Service problem must be all tied in with the operating needs of the Agency. That is, the more the program is tied in with helping people to accomplish their long-range as well as day-to-day tasks, the more successful it will be. I would urge that you give more emphasis to tying in with the operating part of the Agency and avoid becoming so preoccupied by the means that you lose sight of the end.

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18. [REDACTED]: You mentioned that one of the best ways is to keep the program as simple and direct as possible.

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19. [REDACTED]: The flattest I have ever fallen on my face was when I developed for a big company a program which was really good in theory. All professional people who later saw the forms and procedures thought them wonderful. However, because of peculiar circumstances, the proposed program was developed quite apart from operating people and when finally presented in all its glory, it was way over their heads in terms of their operating needs. It was not adopted. Later one of my associates was working on a problem for the sales organization of this same company. The sales department was making organizational changes and had to create new positions. He helped them to devise a simple form to locate people who would meet their real needs. After a lapse of four years, the new program was not too terribly different from the first program but it was kept close to operating needs. It was better to start with something simple. There is a great danger that people given a task like this go further than they should. During the war it was necessary to dream up a management program in the War Department to solve a serious problem. Various people kept raising technical problems and finally General Somervell said: "The

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way to ride a horse is to get on him and ride." General Somervell did not want to spend too much time trying to anticipate every problem in detail. Work out the problems as you go along rather than try to answer all the questions first. Otherwise, you will have gone far beyond people's thinking. They won't know what you are talking about. This might avoid some pitfalls for you. I don't see how you can work out a Program without taking the first step, "What do we require?" If you approach the problem that way you will have no difficulty in getting acceptance in what you are trying to do because the people will clearly see how it will help them to accomplish their mission. To what extent are the various requirements of the Agency the same in all Offices? Will one program be adaptable to the whole Agency? Are you going to need tailor-made programs for the individual Offices? Some people go up through the Administrative side, others through Operations. Some people may work entirely on programs and projects.

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20. [REDACTED] The substantive and administrative channels of this Agency should not be isolated. Administrative officers should be substantively competent.

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21. [REDACTED] I still think that you have to start with the problem of what a person has to do so that you can be sure you are selecting people properly - evaluating experience, proper promotions, etc. Training is to be tied in with all of it.

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22. [REDACTED] The main objective of the Agency is to use its man power more effectively. The Career Service Committee Working Groups have recommended that a system of Office Career Service Boards be established to solve the problem of man-power utilization along the lines outlined in the Career Service Program. An ad hoc committee cannot adequately deal with such a problem beyond the point we have now reached.

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23. [REDACTED] A good example is rotation. It was felt that rotation was needed. The Committee tackled how it would be handled but the question still has to be answered, - "What rotation is needed?" The Career Service Boards will have to face that problem before approving or disapproving a particular recommendation for rotation.

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24. [REDACTED] The Career Service Committee Working Groups do not believe that a rotation pattern can be established that would fit more than a few individuals; they believe that rotation will have to be determined in terms of individuals.

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- 25X1A 25. [REDACTED] You are at a point where you have agreed that rotation is a good training method. You find that there are needs for rotation. But you have to be careful about holding yourself down to real needs. If you accept rotation as a good thing, do not spend too much time on how to rotate. The problem is "whom do we need to rotate?"
- 25X1A 26. [REDACTED] We first have to determine what qualities and abilities are required in individuals who work in a particular job or a job family. [REDACTED] has spent time and thought on that problem.
- 25X1A 27. [REDACTED] As I understand it, there are two schools of thought and for practical purposes we must be sure which we are talking about. Are we concerned with a broad Agency-wide approach that encompasses all CIA personnel? Or, is it a more limited approach, - the executive development and inventory control concept, - that encompasses only those who may occupy key positions in the future.
- 25X1A 28. [REDACTED] We're talking about both. It is the opinion of the Career Service Committee that both programs must go forward and go forward simultaneously.
- 25X1A 29. [REDACTED] If you try to compare people on the basis of appraisal, you get into trouble. How do you know whether you are comparing comparable people? You can't compare bolts and screws. Comparing people is a ticklish business. Supervisor A and B may not have the same thing in mind when they say someone is intellectually imaginative. The only work I did was to consider people purely at a high level and I did so with a pre-determined set of job families. Unless you can compartmentalize people on some rational basis, you have a hard job comparing them.
- 25X1A 30. [REDACTED] What are we trying to accomplish? We should consider the end, not the means, and should not over emphasize the tools. It might be less staggering than looking at the tools themselves. What we want to do is:
- a. Help people perform better on the job through determining what their development training needs are.
 - b. Provide an adequate number of people to take care of future needs; replacement of people who retire, die or move.
 - c. Select insofar as is practical the best qualified individuals for promotion.

Is there a danger that we are going to worry too much about making comparisons? Do we care? You get morale problems but you use it

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merely as a tool, -- only one tool, - and you are going to use a lot of other factors in arriving at your answers. If you regard the appraisal as a check-list, do you need to care if the instrument is scientifically perfect?

- 25X1A 31. [REDACTED] No, I do not think you would.
32. [REDACTED] When you think too much about means instead of the end, you get into trouble. In our firm we try to think along these lines: "How can we be better consultants? What can we do to do our job better?" We have no problem of getting our people interested in development, but how can we accomplish the thing we are trying to do successfully? We do not worry about appraisal as long as it accomplishes the objective, which is the main thing. We don't worry about whether we are being "fair" or "unfair".
- 25X1A 33. [REDACTED] One of the objectives of appraisal is to find out whether an individual can handle a more responsible job.
- 25X1A 34. [REDACTED] You should at all times have three or four people from whom to select the best man, and then try to decide which is going to be the best. Appraisal is merely an orderly process of arriving at your conclusions.
- 25X1A 35. [REDACTED] It is a means of organizing your thinking.
36. [REDACTED] If you concentrate on objectives and do not worry too much about the perfection of your tools, it will move along better.
- 25X1A 37. [REDACTED] Did you see the Personnel Evaluation Report that one of the Working Groups recommended to fill the need for appraisal?
- 25X1A 38. [REDACTED]: Yes, my impression was that as a summary it was fine, provided the right kind of thinking was used to arrive at the answers. There is no way of telling from that form whether people sat down and thought through what the job requires and whether particular people have what it needs.
- 25X1A 39. [REDACTED] The Working Group set before it the purpose of developing a system of appraisal which would serve as an instrument of improving supervisor -- employee relations by insuring that discussion would be held to cover such points as:
- a. Requirements of the job.
 - b. Methods of carrying out assignments.
 - c. Needs of the employee for assistance, guidance or training.

The supervisors would utilize the opportunity presented by these conversations to commend the employee for especially good performance - as well as to discuss his shortcomings. It was felt that the use of this Performance Evaluation Report would also provide informal means of on-the-job training for bettering supervisory techniques. Of course, a prerequisite of appraisal requires knowledge of what is to be appraised. In other words, supervisors themselves have to go through an informal process of making a sort of job analysis of the positions in their units. This is something more than what we generally label job descriptions and qualifications standards. Actually, it corresponds more nearly to what is usually called job analysis in industrial practice.

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40. [REDACTED]: Certainly you have to go through some such process before you can know what these jobs really require. What are the things that really make for success on the job? What are you really looking for? You will never stop probing that question.

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41. [REDACTED] Isn't it true that a supervisor who knows what it takes to bring about success in a certain job could use that form effectively? In the absence of job requirements studies, aren't we dependent on the extent to which supervisors do know what is required?

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42. [REDACTED] In our firm we rely on the crutches of a check-list, just to insure that we have been thinking about a man in an orderly fashion. The only question I have is "Do some of your people require some kind of help in going through the process of thinking?" Don't do anything on this Program until you have the job analysis problem under control. The thing that I have seen happen all too often in business management is that people take care of their corporate conscience by using a lot of meaningless forms with their heads in the sand. They put on what I call a "dog and pony show." They just go through the motions and become so preoccupied with forms that they lose sight of the thing they are trying to do.

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43. [REDACTED] We are not just trying to put on a good show. This program of career development really started when the Agency was first organized back in 1946. People were unwilling to come into the Agency unless they could be given some assurance that it was a permanent organization and that the Agency would take some responsibility in training them. For a while in 1946 and 1947 the Agency policy seemed to be to let the employee get his own knowledge as best he could. The assumption was that if he acquired a new language, say Korean, he would inevitably improve his GS rating, but this hard and fast rule began to be relaxed when it was realized that operations were suffering because we did not have the persons trained to carry them out. So, we began setting up individual programs of training

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and rotation for persons scheduled for specific operations. Our first important language training case was to set up a four months' Korean course for an employee. Later we set up many other language courses, established liaison and exchanged training with the Foreign Service Institute and, in other instances, arranged for training at the Department of Commerce. But, as the organization grew in size it became obvious that the needs of training and rotation could not always be handled on a purely individual basis. Rules and criteria had to be established for determining who could qualify and who should be sent out for training. Of course, the operational goal would always be the decisive factor. At the present time, in addition to the problem of training our people, there is the problem of rotating them. Often the supervisor is unwilling to release a capable man and hides him in order to avoid losing him to some other unit of the Agency which is searching for intelligence-trained and experienced people. We need to rotate persons in order to give them an Agency-wide picture and also, in that way, to learn the jobs which best use their talents.

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44.

Perhaps I could pass along some of the things I have learned the hard way. The problem of hoarding people is not unique with CIA. Two companies have dealt with that situation favorably by creating as powerful an incentive as they can for a supervisor to make men available to other parts of the organization. The thing that is given more consideration when an individual is considered for an increase or a promotion is the extent to which he has developed people. I am doing work now at the U. S. Steel Corporation. The head of the Homestead Plant became famous because he made people available to other parts of U. S. Steel. He was known as a "developer of people." The individual who wants to do the interesting work and use his subordinates to fetch and carry for him is not good. It is worth your consideration that the appraisal form should give recognition to the fellow who is a developer of people and who makes people available to other parts of the Agency.

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45.

What role do you think work measurement has in this problem?

46.

None. Work measurement is repetitive. The work of CIA needs generally high-level thinking ability. I don't think that it is susceptible of work measurement, if you are talking about the quality of a task and the ability of a man to accomplish it rapidly. You can't measure it by the typical yardstick of work units as used in Government. The kind of people you are trying to develop are those carrying on important tasks in this terribly important job. Through CIA, all of us in this country are buying time. It requires very high-level thinking ability for the significant parts of the job.

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47. [REDACTED] The question asked by [REDACTED] on work measurement raises an interesting point especially concerning our personnel in overseas stations. We've got to find some way of measuring their performance. A field officer can, if he is smooth and smart about it, get away without doing very much of anything. He can hold the Ambassador's hand, attend social engagements and send pleasant reports back to headquarters. On the surface it appears that he has done an excellent job but then when the crisis comes we discover that he isn't able to pay off. In spite of his claims, he may not have penetrated the local Communist group and his contacts and controls are not what he led us to believe they were. It is, therefore, necessary to find out: What are the criteria of successful operations in overseas spots? This ties in with [REDACTED] emphasis on job analysis. If the job analysis is done - not in the usual way but by persons who have themselves actually engaged in operations - we will be able to establish the job requirements and the criteria of success which are really important, and then from such an analysis attempt to measure the extent to which the intelligence officer is satisfying job performance requirements.

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48. [REDACTED] What you are really talking about is evaluation rather than work measurement in the usual sense. The question is - is the man overseas really doing the job? I believe that if he knows that he is being evaluated he will do a better job. Also by evaluating him you can help him develop. It is frustrating for a man to have no tangible measures of work performance. I believe that evaluation should be tied into the regular operations of the Agency and done by operating people as much as possible with the help of the Office of Personnel and other support units. The question must always be raised - how can we by evaluating the man on the job better accomplish the task of the Agency?

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49. [REDACTED] Do you think the first question on the Personnel Evaluation Report is good? "List your major duties in approximate order of importance, with a brief description of each. Omit minor duties." The individual thus gives a list of the duties he is carrying out.

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50. [REDACTED] I believe it might be most helpful. However, face to face discussion is advisable to insure that there is a real understanding of the problem.

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51. [REDACTED] The statement of duties in the proposed report would be the subject of discussion between the employee and the supervisor.

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52. [REDACTED] Where do we go next? All documents have gone to the Career Service Committee. Where do we go from here?

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53. [REDACTED] That is hard to answer. I would like to ask you, an abstract question. Is it possible for you to tell us in general what requirements are absolutely essential, without which a development program cannot experience success? We want to stick to essentials and rule out the non-essentials.

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54. [REDACTED] One essential is a real conviction and determination on the part of the top man that he wants to do this badly enough to really work for it. The top man, as is often the case in government, may be primarily concerned with external problems of the Agency, while the No. 2 man may be concerned with its internal affairs. In my opinion, responsibility for this Program could not be delegated below the level of the top man's Deputy. The man responsible must have a real conviction of what he is trying to accomplish, get behind it and work at it until he gets it done. You cannot develop a program until you know what you are trying to do. Find out what is essential for success in this Agency. Start off with a few simple things and develop the Program as you go along.

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55. [REDACTED] Should we try to begin on an Agency-wide basis, or is it essential to first have a test run? For psychological reasons we don't want to start the Program off as a pilot operation.

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56. [REDACTED] I once undertook a pilot operation in one department store and all the other stores in the chain were angry because the program started in another store. I think you should have little trouble getting everyone started thinking about what is necessary for success in his division. The idea is not to have a career program because somebody thinks we ought to have one. Begin by taking first things first. What does it take to achieve our objective? The mere fact that we are here in this meeting is a very important step. What is in the minds of everyone here about such a program? It is possible to become so enamoured with the Program that we become too concerned with the means and forget the end. You have blocked out a program. Where do you start off? By getting your people into deep thought on what it takes to succeed. What are the steps we have to take in order to achieve that? You can't appraise people in the abstract - we've learned that the hard way. We have come to the conclusion that the acid test is demonstrative performance. Has the man been successful in achieving results? You will find some people who are not performing the way they should, and you may see that they do not have the experience they need. How are you going to give it to them? If you come out with job rotation, etc., that will be fine. But all the things you do must be subjected to the acid test of how to accomplish the objective. If it cannot be done one way, can it be accomplished another way?

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- 25X1A 57. [REDACTED] Is the word "career", as used in this Program, misleading? Does it imply the guaranteeing of a career to certain individuals?
- 25X1A 58. [REDACTED] I believe "career" is appropriate, if it is used in an Agency-wide sense. In any career system, whether CIA, the Foreign Service, the Armed Forces or what have you, a quid pro quo between the individual and the organization is implied, even if part of it is intangible and not reduced to a contractual form.
- 25X1A 59. [REDACTED] A part of our group is particularly concerned with setting up certain types of benefits which are to be made available to employees. A career man, or one looked upon as such, should have certain benefits reasonably more tangible than a person who is not going to remain in the Agency. We must offer him something because he is giving up something. It is true that he gets promoted and gets pay raises, etc. But are the intangible sufficient? A career man for CIA should have something more tangible than his regular salary in government.
- 25X1A 60. [REDACTED] Doesn't this Agency need a system of rewards and penalties? This is not a job like one at the Bureau of Customs. The kind of people this Agency needs are those who are self-reliant and risk-taking to do its work. More important than career benefits for an Agency like this is a system that rewards and pushes ahead capable and self-reliant people who are doing a good job and that weeds out those that cannot deliver, even though this results in a lot of turnover. What we do not want to get into this Agency is a Civil Service approach to our jobs -- where no one ever gets fired or rewarded. We need a management philosophy that is going to push the self-reliant, risk-taking people ahead. Does not CIA require that kind of a man? Say, "Here is an Agency that is going to reward the man who can do the job and get rid of the man who cannot."
- 25X1A 61. [REDACTED] We have assumed a well-managed and properly administered career management program. After that are there not certain other benefits we should consider?
- 25X1A 62. [REDACTED] We have taken into consideration the fact that people in overseas positions have to take risks. We have assumed a quid pro quo in connection with benefits based on the philosophy, right or wrong, that all CIA careerists are on duty twenty-four hours a day (without overtime compensation) and are eligible or liable for overseas duty.

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- 25X1A 63. [REDACTED] It is often desirable to have as our field operatives persons who are ruthless and machiavellian against the enemy. But then they should also be loyal, cooperative, and team-workers - when they are dealing with Agency personnel. In other words, they must be ruthless but be guided by ethics and patriotism.
- 25X1A 64. [REDACTED] If the organization ever becomes complacent -- God help the United States.
- 25X1A 65. [REDACTED] We are trying to make CIA the best place in government in which to work. We are proud of trying to make it an elite Agency. That means that the individuals who compose the Agency are valuable not only to CIA but to a lot of other government organizations as well as to industry. It has taken a lot to develop the man to that point and we want to protect our investment. We want to retain these desirable men and the benefits that we talk about will put pressure on them to stay with the Agency.
- 25X1A 66. [REDACTED] Is not the purpose of the whole thing to establish those benefits which will attract and keep desirable people? Those are the benefits we would want to have.
- 25X1A 67. [REDACTED] The question was asked a while back "Where do we go next?" One answer must be that we complete the broad blueprint of the Career Service Program, activate those parts of the Program which can be immediately put into effect, and make the study of jobs, which is a prerequisite for activating other aspects of the Program. This study of jobs must be made by the Working Groups or by Personnel, or, most probably, by the Career Service Boards.
- 25X1A 68. [REDACTED] The Career Service Boards must take the next step. It cannot be done by Personnel. The operating people themselves must do it, otherwise, it will be of no value. You learn by doing, and must go through the process even though you may only do half the job that professional personnel people could theoretically do.
- 25X1A 69. [REDACTED] We now have the terrain, the fence, and the broncho inside. Now we must catch the broncho and start riding him. Mr. [REDACTED] we are grateful to you and look forward to another discussion of these problems later in March.
- 25X1A

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